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Internationalization of the U. S. securities markets involves the import and export
of securities, securities transactions, and securities services providers. Such activ-
ity that touches the United States or otherwise affects U.S. markets may be subject
to U.S. jurisdiction. The manner in which the SEC asserts jurisdiction helps to
define its approach to regulation of the globalized U.S. securities markets. This
article focuses on jurisdictional issues and highlights the ability of the SEC to assert
jurisdiction in both a regulatory and enforcement context as a critical component
of its oversight of the internationalized U.S. securities markets.
I. Administrative Investigations and
Investigative Subpoenas
Most lawsuits brought by the SEC are preceded by an investigation conducted
by the SEC staff to determine whether a violation of securities laws may have
occurred. No person or entity is accused of wrongdoing at this initial stage.
Based upon the investigative record developed, the Commission decides whether
a violation of the law may have occurred and whether an action should be brought
before the SEC or in U.S. courts.
Orders issued by the SEC define the general scope of formal SEC investigations.
These "formal orders of investigation" grant designated SEC staff members the
authority to issue administrative subpoenas under the federal securities laws to
compel the production of documents and testimony relevant to the areas of the
SEC inquiry.
Under federal securities laws, the SEC has express investigative powers,
including the power to issue a subpoena to determine whether a securities violation
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has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. Those same laws give a federal
district court the power to order compliance with a Commission investigative
subpoena.
A. INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS
All the federal securities statutes authorize the SEC to subpoena witnesses
"from any place in the United States."' This statutory language, commonly
employed in the statutes governing most U.S. regulatory agencies, repeatedly
has been construed by U.S. courts to be a broad and flexible authorization to
require the production of evidence from anywhere in the world, as long as service
has been properly effected in the United States. For example, in SEC v. Minas
de Artemisa, S.A.2 the SEC requested court enforcement of an administrative
subpoena to a Mexican company that had been served at the Arizona residence
of an American citizen who operated the company. The court held that the Com-
mission may subpoena documents and witnesses outside the territorial confines
of the United States, if service of the subpoena is properly effected within the
United States. The court stated that "[t]he obligation to respond [to the subpoena]
applies even though the person served may find it necessary to go to some other
place within or without the United States in order to obtain the documents required
to be produced. In Federal Maritime Commission v. DeSmedt,4 brought under
the Shipping Act of 1916, the court held that the plain meaning of statutory
language, identical to that contained in the federal securities statutes, authorizing
compulsory administrative process "from any place in the United States," is
that the agency or court "can require a resident by subpoena to produce documents
under his control wherever they are located. 5 In CAB v. Deutsche Lufthansa
Aktiengesellschaft6 the court held that nearly identical statutory language "was
not intended as a limitation on agency subpoena authority, but rather was intended
to free the agency of the geographic limitations imposed on subpoenas issued
by the district courts." 7 In SEC v. Zanganeh' the court held that the SEC had
no power to subpoena administratively a nonresident alien (Zanganeh), when
service was accomplished by leaving the subpoena at the offices of an Oklahoma
corporation owned and organized by Zanganeh to hold certain Oklahoma lands
for his children. The court held that no personal service had been effected, and
the respondent was not otherwise within the court's jurisdiction as a U.S. citizen
1. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter Exchange Act] Rule 21(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(b) (1988).
2. 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
3. Id. at 218.
4. 366 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
5. Id. at 470-71.
6. 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
7. Id. at 953 (footnote omitted).
8. 470 F. Supp. 1307 (D.D.C. 1978).
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or resident. Finally, in In Re Sealed Case,9 the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court's order holding the appellant (witness) in contempt for failing to comply
with a grand jury subpoena. The witness was subpoenaed in his representative
capacity as custodian of documents "pertaining to the operations of eight foreign
companies with which he was allegedly associated and whose records he allegedly
controls."' 0 The circuit court held, among other things, that the district court
must have personal jurisdiction over each of the companies to order the production
of the companies' records validly and that "[tihe mere fact that the court has
jurisdiction over an alleged representative of the companies is patently insufficient
to establish jurisdiction over the companies." 1 ' The court further noted that the
witness's being an American was irrelevant to establishing jurisdiction over the
foreign companies. 12 The circuit court remanded the matter to the district court
for further consideration of the court's jurisdiction over the foreign companies.
It also held that "an alleged custodian of a collective entity is not foreclosed
from invoking his privilege against compelled self-incrimination with regard to
possibly incriminating testimonial admissions he might make in complying with
a subpoena issued to him in his custodial capacity." 3
B. SERVICE OF INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
Except as provided by statute, U.S. administrative agencies do not have the
power to compel persons outside the United States who have no contact with
the United States (and who, therefore, are not under a federal court's personal
jurisdiction) to produce evidence for an investigation. This lack of power has
been demonstrated in several cases.
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Nahas4 the court held that the
statutory language construed above did not empower an agency to serve, or a
court "to enforce an investigative subpoena served . . . on a foreign citizen in
a foreign nation."' 5 In FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a Mousson1
6
the court held that investigative subpoenas ordinarily cannot be served outside
the United States as a matter of statutory authorization. Rather, when agencies'
statutory language parallels the SEC's, agencies require assistance from officials
of the countries involved, because the compulsory nature of administrative sub-
poenas intrudes upon the sovereignty of states by compelling specific acts by
their nationals. A U.S. court has no power to enforce the subpoena because the
statute does not give the agency the power to serve that subpoena.
9. 832 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
10. Id. at 1270.
11. Id. at 1272-73.
12. Id. at 1273.
13. Id. at 1284.
14. 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
15. Id. at 489.
16. 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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After Saint Gobain, Congress decided that the investigative demands of the
FTC and the Internal Revenue Service were more in the nature of complaints
than subpoenas. Thus, those two agencies have been expressly authorized to
serve investigative demands in foreign states in a manner parallel to the service
of process provisions of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
17
Congress also provided the Commodities Futures Trade Commission (CFTC)
with additional authority to serve subpoenas on persons resident outside the United
States in connection with fraud or market manipulation cases. 18 That legislation,
which was intended to reverse the effect of the Nahas decision, has been objected
to by many countries as an extraterritorial power for the CFTC. This power has
yet to be exercised in a reported case.
C. OBTAINING INFORMATION, TESTIMONY, AND
DOCUMENTS FROM REGISTERED PERSONS
Persons who are registered with and regulated by the SEC and the CFTC are
obligated to make information, documents, and persons available for testimony,
independent of obligations under a subpoena.
1. Service on Market Participants
Foreign brokers and investment advisers registered with the SEC must appoint
the SEC as their agent for service of process in matters arising under the federal
securities laws. 9 In addition, foreign issuers of securities registered under Regula-
tion A under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) must designate the SEC
as their agent for service of process in matters arising from the Regulation A offer-
ing. 20 In connection with recent regulatory initiatives, the SEC has either required
or proposed the designation of an agent in the United States as a condition for utiliz-
ing the initiative. 2 Thus, service upon foreign entities registered in the United
States and upon some foreign issuers can be perfected without going outside the
United States. The SEC's Rules also require registered nonresident broker-dealers
and investment advisers either to maintain books and records within the United
States in compliance with SEC Rules, or to file a written undertaking that they will
furnish such books and records to the SEC upon demand.22
2. Obtaining Documents from Registered Broker-Dealers
Without Issuing a Subpoena
As noted above, the SEC is authorized to require a registered broker-dealer,
no matter where located, to respond to its requests for books and records. The
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (1988) and I.R.C. § 982 (1988).
18. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)(3) (1986).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bl-5 (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 275.0-2 (1994).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 230.262 (1994).
21. See infra notes 452-53, 466-70, 480-83 and accompanying text.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-7 (1994); see Fontaine and I.O.S. Ltd. v. Commission, 259 F. Supp.
880 (D.P.R. 1966).
VOL. 29, NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 735
rules provide that all registered broker-dealers shall make and keep current certain
books and records.23 The rules do not distinguish between domestic and foreign
branch offices of registered broker-dealers or limit the obligation of firms that
maintain foreign branch offices to furnish required records.24 This authority does
not constitute the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, as some commenters
have asserted, but merely reflects the statutory obligations of broker-dealers
registered in the United States.
The SEC has the authority to require a registered broker-dealer to respond to
SEC requests for books and records, no matter where they are located.2 Upon
demand, a broker-dealer's books and records must be made "immediately avail-
able" to the SEC staff for inspection.26 The record-keeping obligations of regis-
tered broker-dealers were designed, in part, to ensure that the SEC has prompt
and unimpaired access to broker-dealers' books and records. Ease of access to
the information reflected in broker-dealers' books and records is necessary to
enable the SEC to discharge its regulatory responsibility to oversee the operations
of registered broker-dealers and to protect the investing public.
The matter of Dominick & Dominick, Inc. and Werner F. Ulrich27 is an excellent
example of the application of these rules. In Dominick, without admitting or
denying the findings therein, Werner F. Ulrich and Dominick & Dominick con-
sented to the entry of an order, dated May 29, 1991. The order instituted proceed-
ings against them pursuant to sections 15(b), 19(h), and 21C of the Exchange
Act; made findings of fact; and imposed remedial sanctions and a cease and desist
order against them, including the barring of Ulrich from working in the securities
industry. Dominick, a broker-dealer registered with the SEC since November
11, 1973, was a Delaware corporation, with its headquarters and principal offices
in New York.28 Ulrich was a registered representative employed as the manager
of Dominick's Basel, Switzerland, branch office since 1968. This matter arose,
in part, out of Dominick's failure to produce or make available records relating
to eight accounts, the holders of which were customers of its Basel, Switzerland,
branch office, in accordance with the recordkeeping provisions of the Exchange
Act and rules thereunder. On February 6, 1990, the SEC staff issued a demand,
pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 17a-4(j), requiring Dominick to produce various
books and records, some of which customarily were maintained in Dominick's
Basel branch office. Although conceding that it made and kept in its Basel office
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(a)(3) (1994).
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(j) (1994).
25. See Exchange Act Rule 17a-4, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(j) (1994).
26. Investing Systems Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,716, at 81,510 (Apr. 1, 1972).
27. Admin. Proc. File No. 3-7502, Exchange Act Release No. 29243, 48 SEC Docket 1544
(May 29, 1991). Note that the SEC Docket citations in this article are those used by the SEC library
and may not be identical with those used by Commerce Clearing House (CCH).
28. Dominick changed its name to Domik Corporation in November 1988. Domik withdrew its
broker-dealer registration on July 28, 1989, but reregistered on July 3, 1991.
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the responsive documents, Dominick initially refused to provide the SEC with
copies of the documents, asserting that such production would violate Swiss
secrecy laws. Dominick also maintained that the Treaty on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters Between the Swiss Confederation and the United States
29
was the exclusive means by which the SEC properly could request the documents.
On October 10, 1990, approximately eight months after the SEC's demand,
Dominick produced the documents. Among other things, the order noted that
the purpose of the action was not to compel the production of documents from
Switzerland (and, therefore, did not implicate the Swiss Treaty), but rather was
to enforce obligations under SEC regulations governing registered broker-dealers
requiring them to conduct their business in a manner that allowed them to furnish
promptly required books and records upon demand from the SEC staff.30 Even
if, as Dominick argued, Swiss secrecy laws prohibited the production of the
requested documents, the SEC found such consequences would not invalidate
Dominick's preexisting statutory obligation. 3'
3. CFTC Requirements for Foreign Commodities Brokers
The CFTC also requires foreign commodities brokers doing business in the
United States to consent to provide it with information under the CFTC's re-
cordkeeping rules (Special Calls). Special Calls are served in the United States
upon designated agents for foreign brokers, and have been in use since 1954.
The failure to comply with the terms of the consent can have severe consequences.
In the Matter of Banque Populaire Suisse32 a Swiss bank declined to comply
with a properly served and executed Special Call. The CFTC found that it had
personal jurisdiction over the bank, because the bank conducted business in the
United States by maintaining and actively trading a commodities account, commit-
ting it to future action on the underlying contracts.33 Service was effected through
the Swiss Government, and was authorized under a Commodities Exchange Act
(CEA) provision requiring reporting by all market participants. The CFTC found
that failure to comply with a Special Call is tantamount to a broker's failure to
comply with the CEA's recordkeeping provisions. 34 The Swiss bank was sus-
pended from U.S. trading for ninety days. Similarly, in the Matter of Ralli Broth-
ers (Bankers) S.A. 35 a Swiss bank declined to comply with a Special Call that was
served upon its agent in the United States. The CFTC reaffirmed its jurisdiction by
29. May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss Treaty].
30. Exchange Act Release No. 29243, supra note 27, at 1549.
31. Id.; see also New York Stock Exchange Release No. 92-9 (Apr. 8, 1992) (instructing NYSE's
members and member organizations to conduct their operations in conformity with the views expressed
by the Commission).
32. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,255, at 25,249 (Oct. 9,
1981).
33. Id. at 25,252.
34. Id. at 25,255.
35. [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,440 (Nov. 30, 1984).
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reason of the bank's business in the United States, and distinguished Saint Gobain
and Nahas because a Special Call did not involve compulsory service abroad.36
The broker was suspended for two years.
II. U.S. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over
International Securities Transactions
U.S. securities laws generally state that they apply to securities sold in interstate
and foreign commerce and through the mails.37 In interpreting such language,
U.S. courts have established guidelines to determine whether they have subject
matter jurisdiction over a dispute with extraterritorial elements. In general, courts
have found subject matter jurisdiction where there is either conduct or effects
in the United States relating to a violation of U.S. federal securities laws.
For example, in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook3' the court held that a U.S. court
has subject matter jurisdiction if a foreign security is registered and traded in
the United States, and that a cause of action is stated when it is alleged to result
from a violation of the federal securities laws that is injurious to U.S. investors,
even if the harmful conduct occurs entirely outside the United States.39 The Second
Circuit concluded that the Exchange Act has extraterritorial application, and
noted, in the context of section 30(b) of that Act, that the SEC had the authority
to regulate "to prevent evasion of the domestic regulatory scheme.' 40
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell4t ' the court held that
where an American investor purchases foreign securities abroad, "significant
conduct" within the United States by a nonresident alien defendant (in this case,
"abundant misrepresentations [made] in the United States") suffices for purposes
of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.42 The court noted that it would
be hard pressed to find jurisdiction when no fraud has been practiced in the
United States and the purchase or sale of securities was outside the United States .41
36. Id. at 29,940.
37. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) [hereinafter Securities Act].
38. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
39. Id. at 206.
40. Id. at 207.
41. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
42. Id. at 1334-35; see also Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983)
(subject matter jurisdiction upheld where the United States was used as a base for fraudulent sales
of U.S. commodities contracts to foreign investors); Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L. (Lebanon),
730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984) (subject matter jurisdiction upheld
where commodities transactions emanated from abroad but occurred in the United States, based upon
the artificial influence such transactions have upon the public markets); Ohman v. Kahn, 685 F.
Supp. 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (motion to dismiss complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
denied; complaint alleged activities in the United States that were integral to the success of the
purported scheme, including the presence of corporate records, a U.S. trademark, and the alleged
use of New York as a base of operations).
43. 468 F.2d at 1334.
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The court held that in the event of conflict, "the nation where the conduct has
occurred has jurisdiction to displace foreign law and to direct its courts to apply
its own."'
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 4 the Second Circuit held that a U.S. court
may exercise subject matter jurisdiction whenever conduct relating to securities
transactions occurs in the United States, unless the conduct at issue is "merely
preparatory," the transactions are "predominantly foreign," and the effects in
the United States are "generalized." 46 Where, on the other hand, U.S. residents
purchased securities in a predominantly foreign offering, subject matter jurisdic-
tion exists against parties essential to the offering to them. Further, the court
held that the application of U.S. securities laws may be triggered by "merely
preparatory activities" when the injured parties are outside the United States,
but are citizens of the United States.47
Finally, the case of SEC v. Collier4' is significant because there the SEC alleged
violations of U.S. securities laws based on information misappropriated in a
foreign country and insider trading conducted on a foreign securities exchange.
The SEC filed a complaint, pursuant to which both defendants consented to, and
the court ordered, injunctions under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
lOb-5. The complaint alleged that defendant Geoffrey Collier misappropriated
information from his employer, a British investment bank, and purchased securi-
ties on the London Stock Exchange through accounts in the United States, alleg-
edly making the purchases through defendant Michael Cassell, a director and
registered representative of an American broker-dealer. The SEC alleged that
conduct significant to the violation occurred in the United States, including trading
through a U.S. broker in an attempt to avoid detection in Great Britain, and
the allegedly illegal scheme involving Cassell, who was associated with a U.S.
broker-dealer.49 Under the conducts test, this activity constituted a sufficient
jurisdictional basis for the court to exercise jurisdiction over this matter.5 0
Decisions about subject matter jurisdiction under the U.S. securities laws have
not been particularly controversial, since the policies of the securities laws of
44. Id. at 1339.
45. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
46. 519 F.2d at 987-88.
47. Id. at 992; see also Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (U.S.
accountants' representations to foreign auditor were "merely preparatory" to foreign offering made
by foreigner).
48. No. 88 Civ. 4505 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 1988); SEC Litigation Release No. 11817 (July 26,
1988).
49. Upon filing this action, the SEC acknowledged the invaluable assistance of the U.K. Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, pursuant to the 1986 Memorandum of Understanding between the SEC,
the CFTC, and U.K. regulatory authorities (Int'l Series Release No. 4 (Sept. 23, 1986)) during the
investigation leading to the filing of its action. SEC Litigation Release No. 11817, supra note 48.
50. Collier, No. 88 Civ. 4505.
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the U.S. generally do not conflict with policies of foreign states. In other areas,
most particularly antitrust law, the issue has been more hotly contested. The
courts frequently have struggled with the doctrine of comity in the face of a
direct policy conflict with foreign law. 5' Of particular interest is the Supreme
Court's recent discussion of subject matter jurisdiction in relation to the applica-
tion of U.S. civil rights legislation, discussed below.
III. Challenges to U.S. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over
International Transactions
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(Aramco)52 the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to hear and
determine cases in connection with activities, even if occurring abroad, that have
some effects in the United States. Consistent with that position, the Second Circuit
has reaffirmed the traditional jurisdictional tests of conduct and effects in securi-
ties cases."
In Aramco the Supreme Court stated that the party seeking the extraterritorial
application of a U.S. statute must make an "affirmative showing" of "the
affirmative congressional intent. . . to extend the protections of [the statute]
...beyond our territorial borders."-5 4 The Court emphasized that "[i]t is a
longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless
a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States.' "55 In this case, petitioner Boureslan, a naturalized
U.S. citizen born in Lebanon and working in Saudi Arabia, was discharged
by his employer, the Arabian American Oil Company, a Delaware corporation.
After filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
he instituted suit in the district court, seeking relief under, inter alia, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,56 on grounds that he had been discriminated
against in Saudi Arabia because of his race, religion, and national origin. The
Court upheld the appellate court's affirmation of the lower court's decision
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that Title VII does not
51. For analyses of whether, in the exercise of its discretion, a U.S. court should forgo application
of U.S. law in light of a direct, substantive conflict with the law of another state, compare Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), with Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1032 (1985), and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979).
52. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
53. Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group plc, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995).
54. 499 U.S. at 249, 250 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 248 (citation omitted).
56. 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6) (1988).
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apply extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of U.S. employers
that employ U.S. citizens abroad. 7
The Court's opinion in Aramco, however, acknowledged its earlier holding
in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.58 that "[u]nlawful effects in this country . . . are
often decisive [in finding subject matter jurisdiction]." 5 9 The district court in
Steele had dismissed the complaint on grounds that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction to award relief to an American corporation against acts of trademark
infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign country by a
citizen and resident of the United States, pursuant to the Lanham Trademark Act
of 1946 (Lanham Act).6° The appellate court disagreed and was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.6' Similar to its opinion in Aramco, the Court in Steele stated
that "the legislation of Congress will not extend beyond the boundaries of the
United States unless a contrary legislative intent appears." 62 Although the Court
spoke of the Lanham Act's "broad jurisdictional grant," 63 its opinion focused
instead on the effects of the defendant's activities in the United States. "[T]he
crux of the complaint here is. . .[that] petitioner by his 'own deliberate acts, here
and elsewhere,. . .brought about forbidden results within the United States.' "64
Indeed, Aramco appears to confirm that a statute with a "broad [albeit general]
jurisdictional grant" along with "some effects" in the United States is "properly
interpreted as applying abroad. ,
65
In Alfadda v. Fenn66 the Second Circuit applied the traditional conduct and
effects tests that have emerged over the years in analyzing the jurisdictional reach
of the securities statutes. "Under the 'conduct' test, a federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction if the defendant's conduct in the United States was more than
merely preparatory to the fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act
within the United States directly caused losses to foreign investors abroad.'
67
Under the effects test, subject matter jurisdiction exists "where illegal activity
abroad causes a 'substantial effect' within the United States." 68 The opinion in
Alfadda is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Steele that "[u]nlawful
57. 499 U.S. at 255. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109, 105 Stat. 1077 (1991) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e(O, 2000e- 1(1988 & Supp. 1992), superseded the holding in Aramco.
That Act now specifies that Title VII applies to U.S. citizens employed by U.S. companies (or foreign
companies controlled by U.S. companies) operating outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. See Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
58. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
59. Id. at 288; see 499 U.S. at 252.
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128.
61. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
62. Id. at 285.
63. Id. at 286.
64. Id. at 288 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
65. 499 U.S. at 252.
66. 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005 (1991).
67. 935 F.2d at 478.
68. Id.
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effects in this country . . . are often decisive [in finding subject matter jurisdic-
tion]. '69 The six plaintiffs in A/fadda, all residents and nationals of Saudi Arabia
or Bahrain, were investors in one of the defendants, the Saudi European Invest-
ment Corporation N.V. (SEIC). The plaintiffs alleged that they were defrauded
when their stake in SEIC was diluted by sales in contravention of an offering
prospectus, and that defendants diverted the proceeds from the sales for their
personal benefit and the benefit of certain favored SEIC shareholders, all in
violation of the Exchange Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO), and other laws.70 Conduct contributing to the alleged fraud
occurred both within and outside the United States. The allegedly misleading
prospectuses upon which plaintiffs relied were sent to them outside the United
States, but defendants' sales to a subsidiary, which resulted in the alleged dilution
of plaintiffs' voting interests, occurred primarily in the United States. The circuit
court, therefore, reversed the district court's order that had dismissed the plain-
tiffs' complaint on grounds that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.7'
Significantly, the holdings in Steele and Alfadda permit the finding of subject
matter jurisdiction where, as is generally the case when the SEC brings an action,
either the forbidden acts have occurred in the United States (for example, a
manipulation or fraud), or those acts occurred abroad but harmed U.S. investors
or securities markets. These situations are distinguishable from nonsecurities
related statutes, such as in Aramco, where both the conduct and the harm (effect)
occur outside the United States.72
IV. Assertion of U.S. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over
Foreign Tender Offers
The globalization of the securities markets has resulted in increased cross-
border trading activity and has increased the likelihood that corporate transactions,
69. See cases cited supra note 59.
70. The amended complaint sets forth causes of action for violations of § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), Rule lOb-5 under that Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990), and
RICO, 15 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d)(1988).
71. 935 F.2d at 480; see also Itobe Ltd. v. LEP Group plc, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995)
(following Alfadda, the court found subject matter jurisdiction where filings were made with the
SEC and there was an apparent effect on U.S. financial markets); Koal Indus. Corp. v. Asland,
S.A., 808 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (follows the tests enunciated in A/fadda in holding that
the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because all the activities constituting the alleged
securities fraud occurred outside the United States and because the effects of the fraud did not relate
to U.S. purchasers or sellers of the same securities that were the subject of the alleged fraud); and
Peters v. Welsh Dev. Agency, No. 86-C-2646, 1991 WL 172940 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1991) (following
Alfadda).
72. See also Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (holding that Argenti-
na's mere unilateral rescheduling of the maturity dates of certain bonds, where the beneficiaries had
designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment on the bonds and the Argentine
Government made some interest payments into those accounts, had a direct effect in the United States
for the purpose of determining subject matter jurisdiction).
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such as tender offers, will impact multiple countries. Few courts have addressed
the issue of when a tender offer in a foreign country involving foreign corporations
becomes subject to the requirements of U.S. securities laws, particularly those
of the Williams Act.73 In three cases, Plessey Co. plc v. General Electric Co.
plc,74 CDC Life Sciences Inc. v. Institut Merieux S.A. ,5 and John Labatt Ltd.
v. Onex Corp. ,76 two of which are discussed below, the courts examined the
subject transactions to determine the impact of the transactions on U.S. sharehold-
ers. In all three cases, the courts concluded that the impact of the transactions
on the United States was not sufficient to trigger application of the Williams Act.
In 1989, in Consolidated Gold Fields plc v. Minorco, S.A. ,7 also discussed
below, the Second Circuit took a new approach, proposed by the SEC, to the
assertion of jurisdiction in securities cases.
While U.S. legal proceedings regarding tender offers generally have dominated
the limelight, they have not been the exclusive focus for the debate. A legal
proceeding in Switzerland highlights the impact of corporate transactions in the
United States on foreign countries. After the announced buyout of R.J.R. Nabisco
by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., two Swiss underwriters sued R.J.R. Nabisco
to force the redemption of Swiss franc-denominated bonds that declined sharply
in price after the announcement of the acquisition. Although the Swiss tranche
was a minor part of the outstanding securities sought in the tender offer, initially
a Swiss court issued a temporary restraining order blocking the completion of
the entire acquisition because of losses incurred by the R.J.R. bondholders.78
Thereafter, a Swiss court lifted the temporary restraining order on the grounds
that RJR agreed to honor the bonds.
The SEC has been working with foreign offerors to address issues raised by
the possible assertion of U.S. jurisdiction and the resultant need that would arise
to make adequate disclosure. For example, a tender offer made by a Canadian
company, RMV Acquisition (discussed below), which appeared to be designed
to exclude U.S. shareholders, was revised to include U.S. shareholders, thus
requiring registration under the Williams Act. 79 In another matter discussed be-
low, the SEC granted Ford Motor Company limited exemptive relief from rules
governing withdrawal rights and purchases outside a tender offer in connection
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d-e), 78n(d-f) (1988).
74. 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986).
75. No. 88 Civ. 2761 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1988) (hearing transcript containing decision denying
motion for preliminary injunction) (unreported).
76. No. 95 Civ. 3828 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1995) (opinion denying target company's motion for
a temporary restraining order against offering company's hostile tender offer; held that offer involving
two Canadian companies, conducted pursuant to Canadian law, and which explicitly excluded U.S.
shareholders (who owned approximately 12% of target company's shares), did not implicate the
Williams Act).
77. 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
78. See Deirdre Fanning, Bonds that Bind, FoRBES, May 1, 1989, at 48.
79. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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with Ford's tender offer for the securities of Jaguar held by U.S. shareholders.°
The SEC granted exemptive relief to Procordia Aktiebolag and Aktiebolaget
Volvo, both listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, to allow them to proceed
with concurrent U.S. /foreign tender offers for the mostly European-held securi-
ties of shares, convertible debentures, and American depositary shares of Phar-
macia Aktiebolag."1 The SEC also issued an order exempting ABN AMRO Hold-
ing N.V., a bank licensed under the laws of The Netherlands, from provisions
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act) in connection
with the offer and sale of its debt obligations and equity securities. 82 Additionally,
the SEC has issued a release seeking comment on a conceptual approach for
encouraging foreign bidders to extend multinational tender and exchange offers
to U. S, shareholders on the basis of foreign disclosure and procedural and account-
ing requirements. 83 These matters are discussed in more detail below.
In Plessey Co. plc v. General Electric Co. plc 4 the district court denied the
Plessey Company's motion for a preliminary injunction to require General Elec-
tric Company to satisfy the reporting and registration requirements of section 5
of the Securities Act and sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act in connec-
tion with GEC's tender offer for Plessey. Both companies were organized and
doing business under the laws of Great Britain. The vast majority of Plessey
shares were held outside the United States (98.4 percent); however, three classes
of Plessey securities were registered or exempted from registration in the United
States pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act and section 5 of the Securities
Act. At the time of the tender offer, approximately 1.2 million Plessey American
depositary receipts (ADRs) were outstanding, which were held by approximately
3,000 persons throughout the United States. Each ADR could be converted into
dollar ordinary shares or sterling ordinary shares, which are registered, but not
traded, in the United States.
On December 3, 1985, GEC issued a press release in England announcing its
proposal for a combination of GEC and Plessey and indicating that it had requested
Plessey management to consider an offer valuing Plessey shares at a certain price.
GEC's press release did not specify the class of securities it sought to acquire
and it did not mention whether the proposed offer would be made to Plessey
ADR holders in the United States. The U.S. press immediately reported this
announcement and Plessey's December 4th rejection of the merger proposal.
GEC issued a second press release in England on December 9th, announcing
GEC's offer for Plessey at more than 160 pence per ordinary share. This release
80. Exchange Act Release No. 27425, Int'l Series Release No. 114 (Nov. 7, 1989).
81. Exchange Act Release No. 27671, International Series Release No. 118 (Feb. 2, 1990).
82. Investment Company Act Release No. 17662, 46 SEC Docket 1374 (Aug. 9, 1990).
83. Securities Act Release No. 6866, Int'l Series Release No. 127 (June 6, 1990).
84. 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986); see also Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988); Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d), (e) (1988).
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specifically stated the offer did not apply to dollar shares or ADRs evidencing
dollar shares. It also stated the offer
will not be made directly or indirectly in, or by use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of inter-state or foreign commerce or of any facilities of a national
securities exchange of, the United States of America, its possessions or territories or
any area subject to its jurisdiction or any political sub-division thereof.85
On December 23, GEC distributed an Offering Circular, required by British law,
detailing the terms of its tender offer.
In concluding that the December 9th press release did not constitute an offer
within the jurisdictional means of U.S. securities laws, the court weighed several
factors, including GEC's exclusion of the American media, GEC's prohibitions
against distribution of the press release in the United States, the abbreviated and
distorted reporting in the United States, the minimal percentage (1.6 percent)
and relative unimportance of the shares held in the U.S., and the minimal effect
on the U.S. market.8 6 The court also considered the extraterritorial effect of U.S.
securities laws and the notions of comity addressed in section 403 of the then
proposed final draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States and concluded "that it would be a perversion of the principles
of the Williams Act to delay the processes of a quintessentially British takeover
when American investors and interests are but barely touched.
' 87
In CDC Life Sciences Inc. v. Institut Merieux S.A.88 Judge Sprizzo rejected a
variety of arguments raised by the plaintiff and preliminarily refused to enjoin
a tender offer made by Institut Merieux S.A. (Merieux), a French corporation
located in France, for the stock of CDC Life Sciences, a Canadian company.
CDC common shares were quoted through the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) and were listed on the Toronto
and Montreal stock exchanges. Merieux sought to obtain majority voting control
of CDC and issued a news release in Canada publicly announcing its offer for
CDC shares. Merieux's offer was open for acceptance on the floors of the Toronto
and Montreal stock exchanges. News of Merieux's offer appeared in The Wall
Street Journal and over the Dow Jones newswire. At the time of its offer, U.S.
investors owned approximately 15 percent of CDC shares. Merieux did not com-
ply with the reporting and procedural requirements of the Williams Act.
The court noted that
no federal court, district or appellate, has ever issued an injunction which prevented a
foreign company from making a tender offer to foreign shareholders merely because the
securities were traded in the American market and were held by American shareholders
who might tender their shares up in Canada although they were not asked to do so.8 9
85. 628 F. Supp. at 482.
86. Id. at 492.
87. Id. at 497.
88. No. 88 Civ. 2761 (JES) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1988) (hearing transcript containing decision
denying motion for preliminary injunction) (unreported).
89. Hearing Transcript, id. at 92.
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CDC argued that if Merieux did not establish adequate safeguards to foreclose
the possibility of Americans tendering their shares in Canada, Merieux could be
in violation of the Williams Act by causing the facilities of interstate commerce
to be used "in that the tender offer would be reported in the United States and
American shareholders would tender their shares in Canada.'9 Although the
court expressed doubt that CDC's argument raised a substantial question going
to the merits, it concluded that even if it did raise a substantial question, "princi-
ples of comity are very strongly . . . against. . . an injunction." 91 Judge Sprizzo
stated, "I am not persuaded as a matter of law that the American securities laws
can have extraterritorial effect in Canada with respect to this foreign offer merely
because shares are traded here and merely because an American shareholder is
not foreclosed from tendering his shares."
92
In contrast, RMV Acquisition, a Canadian corporation, made a tender offer
for outstanding common and Series A preferred shares of Vulcan Packaging,
another Canadian corporation.93 The initial offer provided that RMV reserved
the right not to take up and pay for the tendered shares if less than 662/3 percent
of either class of stock was not tendered. The offering statement provided that
the offer was not being made to U.S. nationals, citizens or residents, who together
constituted approximately 50 percent of Vulcan's total shareholders and held
approximately 30 percent of Vulcan's stock. To be successful in its tender offer,
Vulcan would have needed to obtain a significant number of U.S.-held shares.
RMV made no filing under the Exchange Act in connection with the tender offer.
Partly in response to concerns raised by the staff of the SEC and concern expressed
by the directors of Vulcan for the large number of U.S. shareholders, RMV
announced that if its prior offer were successful, it intended to make an offer in
the United States to acquire all outstanding common shares of Vulcan held by
U.S. citizens and residents.94
On December 5, 1988, the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief in Consolidated
Gold Fields plc v. Anglo American Corp. of South Africa Ltd.95 In that matter,
Minorco, S.A., a Luxembourg mineral resources corporation, made a tender
offer for the shares of Consolidated Gold Fields, a United Kingdom corporation
primarily engaged in mining. At the time of the lawsuit, of the 213,450,000 Gold
Fields shares outstanding, approximately 2.5 percent were held by U.S. residents.
Those shares had a current market value of approximately $120 million.
Gold Fields sought to enjoin the tender offer in the United States on the basis
of alleged securities fraud and antitrust law violations. The district court granted
an injunction on the antitrust law grounds, but dismissed the securities fraud
90. Id.
91. Id. at 93.
92. Id; see also supra note 76.
93. RMV Acquisition, Inc. Press Release (June 14, 1988).
94. Id.
95. 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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claims, holding that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over them.96 In support
of its conclusion, the court noted that only 2.5 percent of the share owners were
U.S. residents; that Minorco had tried to avoid sending its tender offer documents
into the United States; that the bidder and target corporations were both foreign
corporations; and that U.S. shareholders received offering documents "only
because Minorco had to provide" them to the shareholders' nominees in En-
gland.97
The SEC's amicus brief argued that the district court erred in holding that it
had no subject matter jurisdiction over the securities fraud claims before it. Citing
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. ,98 the SEC argued that
this country has the power to prescribe rules governing conduct outside its territory
which has substantial effects within its territory. In this case, the bidder corporation,
by sending allegedly fraudulent offering documents to foreign-based persons who it
knew to be agents of U. S. resident shareholders, engaged in conduct that has a substantial
effect in the United States. A U.S. court therefore has subject-matter jurisdiction over
a securities law proceeding arising from such conduct, notwithstanding the foreign
nationalities of the bidder and target corporations and the foreign residences of the
other target company shareholders. 99
The Commission brief further argued that
under the facts of this case, the district court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction
to grant the particular remedy sought here-a worldwide injunction against the tender
offer-and it was therefore proper to dismiss the securities fraud claims. Under principles
of international law, set forth in the case law and in the Restatements (Second and
Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, a U.S. court must examine
whether, although it has subject-matter jurisdiction, it must abstain from exercising its
jurisdiction because the extraterritorial effect of the particular remedy being sought
would be unwarranted. o
The Commission's brief applies a balancing test, weighing the factors in favor
of and against exercising jurisdiction and states:
Factors in favor of asserting United States jurisdiction to enjoin include the existence
of U.S. direct and indirect owners of shares to whom a tender offer is being made. In
addition, there exists a U.S. trading market in Gold Fields shares and ADRs. On the
other hand, the tender offer is overwhelmingly foreign in character, since the target
and the bidder are foreign companies and approximately 97.5 percent of the shares for
which the offer is being made are held by persons who reside outside of the United
States. Moreover, a large portion of the U.S.-owned shares are held by U.S. residents
through ADRs, which were not sponsored by the target company, and the target com-
pany's shares are listed for trading on eight foreign exchanges and no U.S. exchange.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 496-97.
98. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
99. SEC Amicus Brief at 4, Gold Fields; see also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705,
reh 'g denied, 490 U.S. 1076 (1989) (where defendant wholesaler sold used cars with illegally altered
odometers to auto dealers and those auto dealers resold the cars to customers, the mailing of the
title application was sufficient use of mails to satisfy the mailing element of the crime of mail fraud).
100. SEC Amicus Brief at 4, Gold Fields.
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In addition, the U.K. has a strong interest in regulating this activity, and an elaborate
system of tender offer regulation exists there. 0
The Commission brief additionally draws a distinction between subject matter
jurisdiction and jurisdiction to grant particular remedies, noting that certain other
remedies would have a narrower extraterritorial effect than the remedy sought
in the instant case.
Examples [of remedies] include a Commission action to require corrective disclosure
or other relief tailored to protect U.S. investors, or a private action for damages. The
Commission takes no position on whether those or similar remedies would be permissible
under the facts presented here. However, in contrast to the district court's analysis, the
analysis set forth in this brief-contrasting subject-matter jurisdiction with jurisdiction to
grant particular remedies-would permit a court to enter such narrower relief in an
appropriate case.'O2
On March 22, 1989, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that
"It]he anti-fraud laws of the United States may be given extraterritorial reach
whenever a predominantly foreign transaction has substantial effects within the
United States. "' 03
In Consolidated Gold Fields plc v. Minorco, S.A.'04 the appeals court found
that jurisdiction was established by Minorco's knowing that the British nominees
were required by law to forward tender offer documents to Gold Fields' sharehold-
ers and that "[t]his effect (the transmittal of the documents by the nominees)
was clearly a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory
of the United States." 05 The appeals court rejected the district court's holding
that the Plessey case required rejection of jurisdiction, stating that "the antifraud
provisions of American securities laws have broader extraterritorial reach than
American filing requirements." 06 Having found jurisdiction, the Second Circuit
declined to make a determination as to the appropriateness of the remedy sought.
Rather, the court remanded the case to the district court for consideration on the
merits, stating that if the plaintiffs prevailed, a determination of an appropriate
remedy consistent with comity principles should be made.' 07
On November 7, 1989, the SEC issued an order in the matter of Ford Motor
Company Limited Offer to Purchase the Ordinary Shares and American Deposi-
tary Receipts ofJaguarp. 1. c. '0 8 granting exemptive relief from certain provisions
of the Williams Act and Exchange Act Rules in connection with a cash tender
101. Id. at 24-25.
102. Id. at 25-26.
103. Consolidated Gold Fields plc v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1989).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 262.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 263; see also DeYoung v. Beddome, 707 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (as a matter
of comity, where Canadian law "provides causes of action that are the same in all significant respects"
and the issue of full disclosure by a Canadian corporation in a proxy was sufficiently considered by
the Canadian court, the court will refuse to invoke jurisdiction).
108. Exchange Act Release No. 27,425 (Nov. 7, 1989).
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offer by Ford Motor Company for the ADRs and ordinary shares of Jaguar, a
United Kingdom company. Ford planned to make concurrent cash tender offers
in the United States and the United Kingdom for Jaguar ADRs and ordinary
shares. The original tender offer would have excluded U.S. ordinary sharehold-
ers. However, it was restructured as two separate offers at the same price in
which only U.S. ADR holders and U.S. ordinary shareholders would tender into
the U.S. offer, and U.K. ordinary shareholders and non-U.S. ordinary sharehold-
ers would tender into the U.K. offer, to accommodate conflicting regulatory
requirements in the two jurisdictions.
The SEC granted Ford relief from withdrawal rights provisions of section
14(d)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14d-7 thereunder for the period following
the initial acceptance of shares, allowing it to purchase shares while the offer
remained open for additional tenders. It also granted Ford an exemption from
Rule lOb-13 under the Exchange Act, permitting the U.K. offer to be made
during the pendency of the U.S. offer. The SEC also concurred in Ford's view
that the proposed structure of the U.S. offer for ordinary shares did not violate
the all-holders provisions of Rule 14d-10.
On February 2, 1990, the SEC issued an order in the matter of Procordia
Aktiebolag and Aktiebolaget Volvo Offers to Purchase the Shares, Convertible
Debentures and American Depositary Shares of Pharmacia Aktiebolag'°9 granting
exemptive relief to Procordia Aktiebolag and Aktiebolaget Volvo from certain
tender offer and antimanipulation provisions of the Exchange Act. This exemptive
relief allowed those companies to proceed with concurrent tender offers to acquire
the entire share capital of Pharmacia Aktiebolag through cash and exchange
offers. One of the offers would be made outside the United States and would
not be extended to U.S. persons, and the other would be made to U.S. persons.
Although Pharmacia's unrestricted Class B shares were traded principally on the
International Stock Exchange in London, Pharmacia had American depository
shares (ADSs), representing the unrestricted class B shares, traded on the
NASDAQ. Approximately 3 percent of Pharmacia's share capital were held
directly or indirectly, through Swedish nominees, by persons with U.S. addresses.
The tender offers were structured to resolve conflicting regulatory requirements
and tender offer practices. The SEC noted in its order that given the interest in
treating all shareholders of Pharmacia equally to the extent practicable, the pro-
posed structure of the tender offer did not violate U.S. regulatory requirements.
In yet another matter, ABN AMRO Holding N. V. ,"0 a licensed bank under the
laws of The Netherlands was formed to effect the merger of two Dutch banks,
Algemene Bank Nederland N.V. (ABN) and Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank N.V.
109. Exchange Act Release No. 27,671, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,514 (Feb. 2, 1990).
110. Investment Company Act Release No. 17616 (July 26, 1990) (notice); Investment Company
Act Release No. 17662 (Aug. 9, 1990) (order).
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(AMRO). ABN AMRO offered to exchange its ordinary shares for ordinary and
preference shares convertible into ordinary shares of ABN and ordinary shares
of AMRO. ABN and AMRO shareholders also would receive subscription rights
to bearer depositary receipts with limited exchangeability (BDRs) for new prefer-
ence shares of ABN AMRO. Absent an exemption from the Investment Company
Act, ABN AMRO could not offer to exchange its ordinary shares and BDRs for
the securities of ABN or AMRO held by more than 100 investors in the United
States. The SEC granted ABN AMRO permanent relief based on certain condi-
tions including the regulatory safeguards that were in place, such as ABN AMRO,
ABN, and AMRO being subject to banking regulation in The Netherlands and
the United States, and ABN AMRO's agreeing to be subject to suit and service
of process in the United States. The Commission also considered the importance
of permitting ABN AMRO access to U.S. capital markets and the expansion of
investment opportunities for U.S. investors.
Although the courts in Plessey, CDC Life Sciences, and Labatt concluded that
the subject transactions did not trigger application of U.S. tender offer filing
requirements, there may be fact situations like the RMV matter in which the
same analysis could result in a different outcome. For example, if the total number
of shares held by U.S. citizens and residents were not insignificant or the success
of the tender offer were contingent on the shares held in the United States being
tendered, query whether U.S. courts would order compliance with U.S. tender
offer filing requirements. Further, as discussed in the SEC's amicus brief in
Gold Fields, the SEC has argued strenuously that, where fraud is alleged, subject
matter jurisdiction does not depend on the number of U.S. shareholders and
certain remedies should be available.
V. U.S. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Sales of
Securities in the United States by Foreign Corporations
With increasing frequency, foreign corporations are registering and selling
securities in the United States. The operations of the parent are wholly located
abroad, and the capital raised as a result of the offering is immediately exported
for use in the parent's operation. Accordingly, if irregularities or fraud exist in
the initial disclosure made in the company's registration statement, the unlawfully
obtained money may have left the United States before any action could be taken.
Where this occurs, the SEC faces difficulties both in gathering information to
prove the fraud, and in recovering the money from a foreign jurisdiction. Accord-
ingly, the best, and only practical, opportunity to protect investors is before the
registration becomes effective.
For example, in SEC v. Balsa Donde USA, Inc. and Arye Donde a/k/a Arik
Donde1 1 the SEC sued Balsa Donde USA and Arye Donde for violations of
111. No. 86-3373, Litigation Release No. 11303 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 1986).
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sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act. Balsa Donde was a Delaware
corporation with manufacturing facilities located in Israel. Balsa Donde manufac-
tured airframe components for remote piloted vehicles (RPVs); Arye Donde was
its chief operating officer. The defendants consented to the entry of injunctions
against them without admitting or denying the allegations in the Commission's
complaint.
The SEC alleged that Balsa Donde filed false and misleading registration state-
ments in 1986. The registration statements stated that Balsa Donde was the sole
supplier of RPV airframe component parts to Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI),
and would obtain orders for $1.25 million in airframe components over the next
three years principally for RPVs to be sold by IAI under a $150 million contract
with the U.S. Navy. In fact, Balsa Donde had lost its sole supplier status in June
1985. Arye Donde would receive a portion of a subcontract worth between $27
and $86 million if that portion were not awarded to a competitor.
In a related action, the SEC issued an order instituting proceedings pursuant
to section 8(d) of the Securities Act, which suspended the effectiveness of the
registration statement filed by Balsa Donde. In the order, the SEC found that
Balsa Donde's registration statement contained untrue statements of material facts
and failed to state material facts required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading. 1 2 Balsa Donde consented to the
issuance of the order without admitting or denying the Commission's findings. 3
VI. U.S. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Sales of Securities in the
United States by a Foreign Government
In January 1992 the government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan decided
to offer bearer bonds (five-year maturity priced at par with coupon yields of 1.5
percent above the six-month London Interbank Offered Rate), denominated in
various currencies, including U.S. dollars, for sale in the United States and other
countries. In March 1992 the State Bank of Pakistan caused advertisements for
the bonds, described as "five year bearer certificates," to appear, inter alia, in
the United States in The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and the
United States editions of The Financial Times. The advertisements stated that
the bonds would be available for purchase outside of Pakistan beginning on
March 23, 1992, at the offices of twenty-nine authorized banks identified in the
advertisement, including four U.S. banks that maintain branch offices in Pakistan,
and Pakistani and other foreign banks that maintain offices in the United States.
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act prohibits the offer to sell securities "through
the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise" unless a registration statement
is on file with the Commission. Section 2(3) of the Securities Act defines the
112. Securities Act Release No. 6680 (Dec. 9, 1986).
113. Id.
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offer to sell a security as including "every attempt or offer to dispose of. . . a
security." Section 2(10) of the Securities Act defines a prospectus as including
any "communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security
for sale." The State Bank's advertisements constituted a prospectus, as defined
in section 2(10), and an offer to sell securities. No registration statement had
been filed with the SEC concerning the offer to sell the bonds. Accordingly, the
SEC alleged that the offer to sell the bonds violated section 5(c). Moreover, the
SEC alleged that the State Bank's bond offer did not fall within any exemption
from the registration requirements of section 5. 114 The State Bank consented to
the issuance of an Order Instituting Cease and Desist Proceedings Pursuant to
Section 8A of the Securities Act, and Findings and Order of the Commission,
without admitting or denying the matters set forth therein.' 15
VII. Minimum Contacts: Due Process Limitations
to Personal Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has held that in general it is consistent with due process
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party that purposefully acts to create a
"substantial connection" with the forum state. 1 16 In Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court of Californa, Solano County," 7 however, the Court found
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign third-party defendant is
unreasonable and unfair where the third-party defendant makes no direct effort
to enter the United States. The Court further held in Asahi that the defendant
would be put to substantial inconvenience if forced to defend the action against
another foreign party in a U.S. court, while the original plaintiff and the forum
state had minimal interest in the cross-complaint. Accordingly, the Court's plural-
ity opinion in Asahi held that the exercise of jurisdiction offended due process.
Five of the Justices wrote, in two separate concurring opinions, that while the
exercise of jurisdiction over the cross-complaint did not offend due process, the
connections to the forum state were so strained that a decision to exercise jurisdic-
tion would not comport with fair play and substantial justice." 8
More recently, courts have extended the reach of personal jurisdiction over
defendants under certain circumstances, which could have implications for securi-
ties cases. For example, in United Rope Distributors, Inc. v. Kimberly Line &
114. See SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benev. Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1941).
115. In the Matter of State Bank of Pakistan, Securities Act Release No. 6937 (May 6, 1992).
116. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,475 (1985) (quoting McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
117. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
118. See generally Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987) (private
action brought under Commodity Exchange Act; held, district court lacked personal jurisdiction over
U.K. corporation and resident citizen since federal statute had no provision for service of process
and foreign defendants were not within the reach of the state long-arm statute).
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Kim-Sail Ltd. "9 the district court held that Seatriumph Marine Corporation, a
Liberian corporation with its principal place of business in Greece, was subject
to the court's personal jurisdiction because the company had a New York bank
account that it used as a depository for substantially all its income. The decision
was based on the following facts.
In November 1988 Kim-Sail, a Cayman Islands corporation with its principal
place of business in New York City, accepted 300,000 bales of twine from a
Brazilian company in Brazil for delivery to United Rope Distributors in Wiscon-
sin. The twine was loaded onto the M.V. Katia, a boat owned by Seatriumph,
in Salvador, Brazil. Seatriumph's fees were to be paid in U.S. dollars to a bank
account in New York at the Continental Bank International. Seatriumph had no
contact with New York other than the account. The cargo was never delivered
because the Katia sank on November 25, 1988. Thereafter, United Rope Distribu-
tors brought this admiralty action against Kim-Sail for damages arising from
the loss of the cargo. Kim-Sail impleaded Seatriumph, seeking indemnity or
contribution. Seatriumph moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on grounds
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The district court denied Seatri-
umph's motion and held that Seatriumph was "conducting business" in New
York as contemplated by New York's long-arm statute.120 It noted that Seatriumph
used the account to pay the wages of its crew and other expenses. Upon reconsider-
ation, the court adhered to its earlier holding denying Seatriumph's motion to
dismiss the complaint, stating that "Seatriumph chose to avail itself of the special
advantages of conducting its business through a New York bank and thus deliber-
ately invoked the benefits and protections of New York's laws.'' 2 1 The court
also appeared to rely on its perception that an employee of the bank functioned,
in practical terms, as a domestic agent for Seatriumph because "[t]he ready
availability of the telephone, telex, and fax makes it possible, from an office in
Greece, to use a bank in New York to do all the things that a foreign corporation
once needed to send an agent to New York to do." 2  The court acknowledged
that several cases have held that a bank account does not by itself constitute
sufficient presence in New York to subject a foreign corporation to personal
jurisdiction, but distinguished them on grounds that those accounts "were inciden-
tal to the business activities of the corporations that owned them."' 23
119. 770 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), adhered to on reconsideration, 785 F. Supp. 446
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
120. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. R. § 301 (McKinney 1990).
121. 785 F. Supp. at 450.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (dictum) (assum-
ing, arguendo, that Argentina is a person for purposes of the Due Process Clause, the U.S. court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over it on the basis of Argentina's issuance of negotiable debt
instruments denominated in U.S. dollars and payable in New York and appointment of a financial
agent in that city).
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In yet another landmark case, the U.S. district court, in Gottlieb v. Wiles ,124
found personal jurisdiction over Coopers & Lybrand Hong Kong (C&L Hong
Kong) and Coopers & Lybrand Singapore (C&L Singapore), independent affili-
ates of the U.S.-based accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand (Coopers), because
their conduct caused "foreseeable consequences" in the United States. The com-
plaint alleged that in 1984 MiniScribe Corporation entered into a written audit
engagement agreement with Coopers that provided for audits of the subsidiaries
of MiniScribe in Hong Kong and Singapore by C&L Hong Kong and C&L
Singapore, and that C&L Hong Kong and C&L Singapore aided and abetted
Coopers and other defendants in violating section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule lOb-5 thereunder. Specifically, the complaint alleged that C&L Hong Kong
and C&L Singapore performed audits or examinations of the financial records
and statements of MiniScribe and its subsidiaries (including an audit of the exis-
tence and valuation of inventories held on consignment for MiniScribe), and
provided reports of their examinations, via the mails and telecommunications,
to Coopers' Denver office. It further alleged that C&L Hong Kong and C&L
Singapore knew that MiniScribe was publicly traded in the United States and
that Coopers would use such reports in rendering opinions as to MiniScribe's
financial statements included in MiniScribe's 1986 and 1987 Form 10-Ks filed
with the SEC and MiniScribe's 1986 and 1987 annual reports. C&L Hong Kong
and C&L Singapore frequently communicated with Coopers concerning the
audits. Moreover, the plaintiffs proved that some or all of the fees for the work
being done by C&L Hong Kong and C&L Singapore were negotiated by, and
billed to, MiniScribe through Coopers in Denver.
C&L Hong Kong and C&L Singapore asserted that they were not subject to
the jurisdiction of the court because (1) they were foreign entities located in Hong
Kong and Singapore; (2) neither of them owned, rented or used property located
in the United States; (3) they were not licensed to practice accounting in the
United States; (4) they did not have partners who were citizens or residents of
the United States; and (5) they did not audit the statements or records of MiniScribe
or give any opinions on the financial statements of MiniScribe. The court denied
C&L Hong Kong's and C&L Singapore's motion to dismiss the Third Consoli-
dated Amended Class Action Complaint against them.'25 Among the reasons for
the decision were that the defendants "caused foreseeable consequences" in the
United States, 2 6 and that a substantial connection between C&L Hong Kong and
C&L Singapore and Denver came about by actions of the companies "purpose-
fully directed" toward Denver.
127
124. No. 91-M-963 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 1992).
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1316 (9th Cir.
1985)).
127. Id. (citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County,
480 U.S. 102 (1987)).
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United States courts have also upheld service on foreigners through their U.S.
brokerage firms. For example, in SEC v. Fondation Hai128 there were allegations
of insider trading, largely through brokerage accounts maintained by foreign
investors, in the common stock and options of Rorer Group, Inc., a U.S. pharma-
ceutical company, prior to the January 15, 1990, public announcement that Rorer
was engaged in merger negotiations with an unidentified company. The district
court upheld court-authorized service of process on foreigners through each defen-
dant's U.S. broker, as agent, on grounds that it comported with the requirements
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e) & (i), and due process.
128. 736 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y.), modified in part, vacated in part, SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910
F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 917 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1990).
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